Abstract
Introduction
The ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) have played a proactive and sometimes influential role in regional debates on Asian economic integration and security cooperation. These think tanks and their directors sought to promote social learning and help create a sense of regional identity at an elite level amongst nascent regional policy communities. This contribution to regional cooperation was through a 'repeated cycle of interaction, interpretation and internalization' (Johnstone 2005, p. 189) conducted via intensive networking and informal diplomacy. Think tanks have often provided the 'neutral territory' outside the architecture of the state for the conduct of informal diplomacy. Such networking entails unofficial activities involving academics and intellectuals, journalists, business elites and others as well as government officials and political leaders 'acting in their private capacity' (Jones 2008, p. 2) .
For several decades a number of Asian think tanks have had research programmes concerning economic affairs of the Asia-Pacific and later, security cooperation. Their role has been at the earlier stages of regional cooperative efforts; that is, agenda setting. Rather than focusing on political and economic interests involved in the tangible features of building institutions of regional cooperation the focus of this paper is on prior efforts of agenda setting under taken through research, advocacy and networking of think tank staff with political elites. Through longstanding interaction at conferences or workshops, shared experiences have forged strong links between institutes. The body of policy related research conducted by think tanks from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) states, combined with their policy entrepreneurship, contributed to political understanding about the possible benefits of cooperation. In short, an 'interpretive community' was built (Johnstone 2005) . Examination of the debates on ideas of economic and security cooperation which preceded attempts at institutionalization, drives analytical attention to scholars, think tanks and other opinion leaders.
Accordingly, this paper contributes to the literature on knowledge utilisation, specifically debates on the role of ideas in policy. This literature has been criticised for assumptions that paradigmatic shifts or policy learning occurs as ideas are 'diffused' into the policy atmosphere without sufficient explanation of the mechanisms and agents through which diffusion occurs (Campbell 2008) . Regarding the knowledge-policy nexus, this paper does three things: First, it pays attention to the organizational and individual actors who generate and advocated ideas on regional economic and security cooperation. Second, the paper draws attention to the mechanisms by which they informed policy -the dialogues sustained over the long term through a regional network of Institutes (ISIS). Third, through the policy process of 'informal diplomacy' that became institutionalised, ideational policy entrepreneurs had access to government, business and other political elites and their decision making forums (Rouhana 1995) . In sum, the paper outlines how an interpretive community emerged and operated. Some claims are made about the influence of ASEAN-ISIS albeit with the caveat that impact is variable, quite often intangible and is time and context contingent. Nevertheless, ASEAN-ISIS was an innovation spurring new institutions of regional governance via informal diplomacy.
To be sure, there has been recognition of the role of ASEAN-ISIS in the evolution of Asian regionalism. However, this literature is firmly based within the discipline of International Relations and International Political Economy. The epistemological precepts of both Realism and Liberalism put the 'state' as prime unit of analysis. Realists would dismiss think tanks as irrelevant 'bit players' in regional power plays or, at best, analytic support service to formal decision makers. Liberals are more likely to regard think tanks as tools for intergovernmental cooperation but likewise see them as secondary actors subject to the diktats and preferences of the state. Sovereignty and national organization is the structuring principle of societal and political action. Both theoretical traditions suffer from 'methodological nationalism' and 'state-centrism': non-state actors such as think tanks tend to be lost from analytical sight, and transnational processes disregarded.
Instead, it is the Constructivists and neo-Gramscians (Parmar, 2002) that have highlighted the power of ideas and the role of research communities in developing normative understandings of regional identity. Even so, the object of analysis of constructivists has not been university research institutes, think tanks or their networks (exceptions being Capie & Taylor 2010; Job 2004) . Instead, such studies tend to explain patterns of inter-state cooperation and the genesis of regional
institutions. An ontological separation between the scholar and the policy practitioner, between knowledge and power is often maintained. The research and intellectual interpretation that underpins conceptualisation of 'regional cooperation' is treated as an expert 'input from an 'epistemic community' (Rüland 2002) , or a one-way transmission of ideas into policy debate. This paper puts think tanks, intellectuals and the interpretive communityhence knowledge in the form of research, conferences and learned debate -at the centre of analysis as both agents and structures in the construction of region.
Collectively, the South East Asian think tanks created a transnational network to sustain a governance space for regional cooperation. Thus, the network and its component organizations create, synthesize, legitimate, and disseminate useful knowledge played a significant role in the emerging regional governance system. In doing so, this paper is informed partially by constructivist thought but also draws upon 'discourse institutionalism' (Schmidt 2008) and post-structuralist 'interpretive policy studies' (Fischer 2003) .
Doing so, complicates the picture of ASEAN-ISIS as a non-state actor and exposes the status of the network and of informal diplomacy as resting on uneasy distinctions between 'public' and 'private' (Nesadurai and Stone 2000; Evans 2006) as well as a false division between knowledge and power. The research and analysis of the interpretive community is not 'independent' or created in a domain separate from policy and politics that is only utilized when contracted or called upon by government actors, but deeply imbricated in policy making as a part of the mode of governance. Rather than a mere resource for other interests, knowledge actors and knowledge discourses are a form of power essential to the construction of region.
Informal Diplomacy
Informal diplomacy is not state-centric and incorporates a more diverse range of actors than bureaucrats and politicians in international negotiations. Track One (T1) diplomacy are diplomatic efforts of bureaucrats to resolve conflicts through official channels of government (Kaye 2007, p. 5) . However, official diplomats in Track One increasingly share the world stage with and make use of the growing cast of non-state actors. What has become known as Track Two (T2) is an arena for non-governmental public action. T2 is symptomatic of the breakdown of traditional distinctions between foreign policy making and domestic policies that are mirrored in the academic fields of international relations and public policy respectively. Track Three (T3) diplomacy occurs among civil society groups.
To complicate matters, the notion of Track One-and-a-Half (T1½) is also used to refer to describe something between an autonomous T2 and official diplomacy (see Nan, Druckman and El Hor 2009) . The ideas of T1, T1½, T2 and T3 may be thought of as points on spectrum from state exclusive and often secret processes at one end to non-state public processes at the other. Hence the preference in this paper for the term 'informal diplomacy' given that T2 can morph into T1½ over time (Capie and Taylor 2010, pp. 365-67) and terminological nuances in different political cultures (Job 2004, p. 250; Rouhana 1995) .
T2 diplomacy entails "unofficial dialogues often facilitated by an impartial
Third Party and involving individuals with some connections to their respective official communities, focused on co-operative efforts to explore new ways to resolve differences over, or discuss new approaches to, policy-relevant issues" (Jones 2008, p. 4) . It is conducted through closed dialogues "either because of government uncertainty on how to proceed with sensitive discussions, or because of a lack of professional expertise" (Kim 2001, p. 1) . It can include academics and intellectuals, journalists, business elites and others as well as officials 'acting in their private capacity' (Ball, Milner and Taylor 2006, p. 175) . This diplomacy usually takes place in an 'off-the-record' setting. That bureaucrats and politicians are acting in their private capacity is to be treated as a 'polite fiction'. Official and non-governmental participation in seminars, conferences and organizations is 'mixed' or 'blended' suggesting that the demarcation between official and unofficial involvement is unclear (Kraft 2000) . Some processes can be secretive such as the Oslo Process in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict (Chataway 1998; Fisher 2006 ). In the ASEAN-ISIS case discussed here, T2 was a more public albeit quite exclusive process.
T2 is also different from 'cultural diplomacy' with which intellectuals are often associated (Guilhot 2006) . Cultural diplomacy usually originates from within civil society; that is, inspired by philanthropists, artists, sports enthusiasts or academics and has recently morphed into the 'celebrity diplomacy' associated with aging rock stars (Cooper 2007) . Whilst track-two incorporates figures from civil society, it is distinct given the direct ties to, and sometimes long-term involvement of government officials and politicians in network building and patronage of university institutes and think tanks. T2 diplomacy is semi-official, a hybrid form of diplomacy that uses interlocutors between state actors. This occurs in situations where governments wish to express intentions or to suggest methods of resolving a diplomatic situation, but do not wish to express a formal position. In reverse, informal diplomacy also provides windows of opportunity for non-state actors or policy entrepreneurs from the interpretive community to independently influence government by providing analysis or evaluations (Chataway 1998, p. 275; Lee 2009 ).
Often regarded as independent organizations, think tanks can create neutral territory in the form of private dialogues where all parties to a concern can meet to discuss possibilities for policy. Think tanks play a facilitating role. To an extent, they act as the 'honest broker' inviting all interested parties to sit down behind closed doors to address a particular problem or proposal. They provide 'a middle ground'
where new forms of cooperation or controversial approaches to regional conflicts can be explored without fear of public exposure. Such an activity is useful to governments if the think tank is a prominent organisation of which foreigners have heard, and more importantly, if it can draw upon a network of distinguished states-people, business leaders, diplomats, military officers, experts and scholars (Parmar 2002) .
Informal dialogues are also valuable at times when for whatever reason, official dialogues are stalled or official relations strained (Chataway 1998, p. 273 ). On the negative side, governments can use the track-two process and think tanks for the purposes of public symbolism. Non-officials are given the impression that their advice and analysis is useful although this could be illusory. In mainstream international relations, sceptical assessments prevail among policy practitioners who see few if any concrete results from such unofficial endeavours (Jones 2008, p. 2; Kaye 2007, p. 3) . Some realists have a tendency to see dialogues and multilateral discussions as little more than 'talking shops'. That is, the various policy dialogues may offer little more than an amenable social and intellectual exercise for participants. However, other realists would argue that their key concerns about 'balance of power' continue to permeate T2 dialogues (Rüland 2002, p. 93; Lee 2009 ).
The "realist" school tends to favour explanations of international affairs which stress interest based bargaining, the competition for power between states and zero-sum games. Social-psychological and constructivist theories tend to stress interpersonal relations, community building and the development of norms. While neither realism nor constructivism is so definitive as presented here, most Track Two is more comfortable in the latter tradition (Jones 2008, p. 11) .
The interpretive community framework adopted here goes one step further than constructivism to argue that policy is dependent on, and framed by, knowledge and ideational forces. In this perspective "…it is a mistake to believe that T2 diplomacy is merely dialogue for dialogue's sake... (for) it creates a positive atmosphere that is conducive to the formation of regional identity (Kim 2001, p. 4) . With the emphasis on consensus building, the filtering and re-assemblage of ideas and the socialization of elites, the focus is more on discourse and interpretation by the Institutes of norms of regional cooperation. That is, the routes and processes through which vague and general concepts are transformed into policy practices and political objectives (Schmidt 2008) .
A focus on discourses of informal diplomacy is to focus on the processes by which new ideas are created, moulded, elaborated, disseminated, expounded and adjusted to practical realities. A dilemma in the literature on the role of ideas in policy is the paucity of explanations about how, where, when and why new ideas emerge and why they are picked up. That is, there is insufficient analytical attention directed to the mechanisms of ideational impact and the agency of actors in spreading ideas (Campbell 2008) . The interpretive community of ASEAN-ISIS think tanks is one such mechanism.
Outlined below, Asian think tanks and the ASEAN-ISIS network they built is the mechanism through which they became involved in informal diplomacy and built trust and understanding among South East Asia's policy communities. The network was a vehicle for policy learning. It was not sufficient for 'vague' ideas or policy research on security cooperation to be 'diffused' through traditional processes of academic publication or public speaking for such ideas to find their way into policy discussion by serendipity. There is no automatic process that new policy ideas will seep into the consciousness of political and policy elites. Instead, it is necessary to focus on the discursive constructions and agency of policy entrepreneurs, their research institutes and their networks.
By no means is ASEAN-ISIS the first experiment in international networking among intellectuals to influence policy thinking. In the Cold War context, the cultural diplomacy of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Fondation pour une Entraide Intellectuelle Européenne aided "the intellectual network building that contributed to the emergence of new political and cultural elites in Eastern Europe, providing them with political legitimacy and international contacts to move swiftly and powerfully into the post-Communist era" (Guilhot 2006, p. 408) . Similarly, there are many studies of the historical and contemporary role of think tanks in the policy process.
Yet, such studies remain focused on OECD contexts and 'expert internationalist organizations' like the Council on Foreign Relations … (which ) has been at the heart of the American foreign policy establishment" (Parmar 2002, p. 241) . What is remarkable about the Southeast Asian institutes is their sustained long-term crossnational collective action. And notwithstanding theoretical debates about their impact (or not) and the influence of ideas, the pace of informal dialogues accelerated, diversified and continues to attract governmental sponsorship.
Southeast Asian Policy Institutes
This paper cannot enter into the inconclusive definitional debates concerning 'think tank'. Nevertheless, it is important to note that most of the Southeast Asian think tanks discussed here are different to their Western counterparts. AngloAmerican think tanks are usually 'non-governmental' bodies assumed to be intellectually autonomous and growing out of civil society. By contrast, the institutes discussed here have both formal and informal ties to national political elites and the state apparatus (Nesadurai 2011) . "State and non-state actors in ASEAN have proceeded in a very complex environment that displays authoritarian and democratic features simultaneously, a high degree of power monopoly on the part of a small circle of elites consolidated by the infrastructure of an interventionist state" (Manea 2009, p. 37) . In some instances, the ASEAN institutes may be better described as GONGOs -governmentally organised NGOs, or MANGOs -manipulated NGOs. It is the case that many Western think tanks (like the US Institute of Peace) are largely funded by government, as is also the case of SIPRI in Sweden, and on this basis might be categorised as MANGOs. However, what is important is both the liberal political culture and open societies in which they operate, as well as close adherence to international best practice in social science research. Needless to say, long-term dynamics towards democratisation in South East Asia alongside 'knowledge for development' capacity building can alter over time whether or not institutes are classed as MANGOs.
In most Southeast Asian countries, the first generation think tanks were elite, establishment bodies like the Singaporean Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) (Sandhu 1991, p. 3) . The regionally oriented Institute of South East Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta were created with government funding and patronage. Sometimes, they were set up directly within government or as a non-departmental public body -a quango.
For instance, the Philippine Institute of Development Studies is an economic think tank established by government decree in 1977. In other words, their primary purpose was to provide information and act as a sounding board for government.
When ASEAN-ISIS was rising to prominence in the 1990s, Asian think tanks were considered by many Western observers to have an unhealthily close relationship with government. Some critics claimed that these bodies were 'state-directed' (Jayasuriya 1994) . Their importance to the state was in their capacity to amplify messages that come from the top down to the rest of society. Consequently, Asian think tanks tended to be "regime enhancing" rather than "regime critical" (Yamamoto and Hubbard 1995, p. 45) . This also applied to regional institutional initiatives as think tanks began to engage in policy dialogues across borders. Thus while depicting their dialogues as T2, in reality the close political connections of think tank directors of that time suggested their activities were rather more T1½.
The launch of ASEAN in 1967 and its slow consolidation over the 1970s and 1980s gradually generated a regional source of demand for policy analysis. The ASEAN secretariat has lacked sufficient strength and staff to conduct policy research and advisory functions. There has been a policy analysis vacuum in the formal structures of regional governance. This lacunae provided a window of opportunity for think tanks in Southeast Asia (as well as researchers in universities and elsewhere) to provide research and analysis on security and economic co-operation via ASEAN-ISIS. This does not mean that T2 displaces T1. However, ASEAN was reliant on the Institutes (and other actors) to provide the convening, the conference organisation, the dialogue vehicles and other activities that allowed the 'habit of dialogue' to become a reality and on-going practice.
The ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies was launched as a formal association in 1988 (although there were informal meetings in years earlier).
It was founded by think tanks in four of the core ASEAN countries:
• Centre for Strategic and International Studies -CSIS Indonesia The Asia Pacific Roundtable is its oldest activity and most closely associated with T2 diplomacy (Soesastro, Joewono and Hernandez 2006, p. 2) . Indeed, it has been described as the 'grand-daddy' of all T2 in the region (Butcher 2009 The development of the regional network over a decade and growing recognition of it as a space and place for policy dialogue had the effect of prompting institutional development at the national level in those countries where think tank development was not known. There was a 'boomerang effect' of regional dialogue and networking spurring national-level institutional development in order that the new national institution could participate in the regional debates on economic integration and security cooperation. That is, a replication process to consolidate the network structure paralleling the formal intergovernmental ASEAN organisation.
A "Relentless Conversation": Regional Identity and Community Construction
Think tank manipulation of political and cultural symbols contributes to the formation of collective identities at the regional level. This idea draws on Wendt's (1994) constructivist hypothesis that state identity can be endogenous to the process of structured interaction between states. That is, states often share similar interpretations of their environment. States also depend on each other, in part, for the creation of these interpretations; and furthermore, the strategic interaction of states further contributes to shared understandings.
A shared idea of regional identity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the states of the region to establish a framework for political and economic cooperation or harmonisation of policies. Political leaders of Asian countries have often talked of "Asian values" in their regional security community or economic dialogues. That is, "states are engaging in discursive practices designed to express and/or to change ideas about who 'the self' of self-interested collective action is" (Wendt 1994, p. 391) .
Engaging in cooperative acts can become a self-reinforcing dynamic that allows actors to reassess core beliefs and come to new understandings. By teaching themselves and others to cooperate, they effectively create new identities. Part of the learning and interactive process occurs through the strategic narrative practices designed to persuade others to change conceptions of their interests. The greater the degree of conflict in the international system, the more likely states will fear each other and defend their "egoistic identities" (Wendt 1994) . By contrast, where there are positive shared understandings and mutual recognition of sovereignty among states, there is potential for collective identity formation. States are also more likely to identify their interests with others, when they share a common fate and cannot act unilaterally to undo that fate. Aspects of egoistic identities increasingly become redundant provided states do not respond defensively to their vulnerability. The discourses of cooperation can aid collective action by helping create a sense of solidarity. The discourse of ASEAN-ISIS became an elite system of meaning for the policy community that ordered the production of interpretations of the social world in the context of the post Cold War security vacuum in the region. A major concern "was the need to prepare ASEAN to anticipate impending changes in the regional and global order" (Sukma 2006, p. 91) .
One area where NGOs, think tanks and experts can be found is in regional 'interpretive communities'. However, these communities are not neatly defined. The ARF operates on the basis of cooperative security rather than common security (Dewitt 1994). Unlike common security approaches, cooperative security is less fixated on the rapid development of formal multilateral institutions, preferring the establishment of habits of dialogue. The ARF replaced the Cold War security structure (which was based primarily on bipolar power balancing and bilateral alliances) with a multilateral diplomatic approach that emphasizes consultation, inclusiveness and engaging "adversaries". The latter has been termed "soft regionalism" or 'soft dialogue' as opposed to the 'hard dialogue' associated with formal institutions (Acharya 2004 ).
While these dialogues have been strongly influenced by European ideas, the evolving discourse necessarily has a distinctly Asian flavour and regionally specific institutional 'field of practice'. For instance, the main elements of a cooperative security discourse include emphasizing political dialogue at both the governmental and non-governmental levels, a non-confrontational approach to dispute settlement, establishing comfort levels, frequent consultations and consensual decision-making.
In short, ideas about common and cooperative security have been translated or interpreted and then adjusted, modified and adapted in unique ways (Kjaer & Pedersen 2001, p. 221) to the particular regional and historical context of East Asia.
That is, 'the ASEAN Way' and a home grown Asian strategic culture. Measurement of impact of regional discourse is likely to remain elusive. This is due to numerous other intervening variables that muddy the causal path between ideas and policy (Rouhana 1995, pp. 264-65) .
Even so, the state-centric approach does provide an antidote to over-determining Affairs is a self-standing and self-financing organization, though does receive government funding. CSIS in Jakarta has evolved from having a close relationship to government to being an autonomous institution in the past decade (Evans 2006, pp. 99-100) .
The demarcating line between unofficial T2 and official T1diplomacy is blurred to become indistinguishable (Ball, Milner and Taylor, 2006: 184) . The grey areas in the status of ASEAN ISIS as part public, part private is very convenient for all parties to informal diplomacy. The distinctions between T1, T2 and increasingly T3 are more than symbolic and have functional value. "This 'disclaimer' erects a mythical separation of private and public diplomacy and allows sensitive issues to be discussed without the burden of official accountability" (Kim 2001, p. 2).
Within the tense security environs of the early 1990s, ASEAN-ISIS was able to emphasise its non-governmental status -neutral territory at the regional level -in promoting sensitive ideas and policy recommendations on security cooperation. At the same time, the (semi-)official status of key members attending T2 activities and dialogues meant that state interests were protected and pursued in a 'safe' setting. In reality, the public and the private were very blurred, deliberately so. Through the symbolic distinctions of T1 and T2, the 'mythical separation' of official and informal diplomacy has practical advantages in creating forums for discussion of threat perceptions and other delicate issues in low risk settings.
Influence has been a gradual process. And it has not been a constant one. The whereas ASEAN-ISIS is constituted by think tanks.
CSCAP was established with the purpose of serving as the ARFs Track Two mechanism". This has involved delivering "the necessary support activities for the ARF agenda, and make recommendations which are relevant for policy implementation" (Kerr 1994, p. 404 However, the T2 to T3 process has had a short and chequered history leading "some CSOs to accuse ASEAN-ISIS of restricting rather than opening channels for dialogue with ASEAN" (Collins 2008) . Participatory regionalism also requires ASEAN governments and officials to create space for these groups in ASEAN deliberations.
In reality, "ASEAN has not always been supportive of APA". Moreover, when Analysis of the regional think tank networking of ASEAN-ISIS informs our conceptual understanding on the knowledge-policy nexus on three fronts: First, analysis of bodies like the ASEAN-ISIS directs attention to the agency of researchers and research institutes. That is, what they said and wrote, the web-sites established, the workshops and meetings organised, as well as the personal relationships and professional ties built. Second, their analytical work was not allowed to simply diffuse into the public realm, but was actively propelled into policy circles through a very entrepreneurial regional network. Third, and subsequently, the non-governmental networking was institutionalised as a (semi-)private policy process that 'shadowed' official deliberations via T2 diplomacy.
The achievements of ASEAN-ISIS were to create and help sustain a regional interpretive community. Indicators of ASEAN-ISIS impact are numerous: (1) it was an early entrant to, and initiated new T2 processes; (2) it built a regional network that Instead, it expanded with new activities that attract funding and patronage. Others with certainty in the power of ideas have copied ASEAN ISIS via additional T2
networks. All this suggests that ideational work is essential to institutional innovation.
As a consequence, the ontological separation between the scholar-researcher and the policy practitioner -exemplified by the very terms T1 and T2 -is destabilised and undermined. Instead, knowledge and power are seen as intertwined and inseparable. 'Region' and institutions of regional cooperation first needed to be 'thought' -researched, critiqued, debated -before they could be created. In this framework, the research/interpretive community that is drawn from universities and think tanks becomes a central component to governance. This is in contra-distinction to the Realist and Liberal perspectives that would regard the think tanks and T2 networks as 'interlocutors' or 'ideas brokers' between the research world and the state; that is, "reinforcement for T1 processes" (Morrison 2004, p. 551) .
The research/interpretive community is not based in a separate or independent domain distinct from policy and politics feeding ideas in a one way transmission process to decision makers. Nor are think tanks and networks merely hinged or fused onto political processes to legitimate inter-governmental cooperation. Instead, they are inextricably bound with such processes. This is not just blurred lines between publicprivate. Rather, knowledge is mutually constituted with governance. Nevertheless, the 'mythical separation' of official state directed T1 vis-à-vis private NGO-led T2 is maintained because it is useful for ASEAN governments to sponsor so-called independent 'thinking outfits' to act as non-state interlocutors. It is a source of legitimation in the sense of consulting independent expertise outside the state, and a means to manage either sensitive or highly technical policy concerns between states.
Over a period of two decades a field of practice was created, and continues to be sustained, by the ASEAN-ISIS and many other T2 initiatives in the interpretive community. This is not to say that regional identity acquisition is learned automatically through processes of T2 communication and social engagement.
Identity creation is a much more variable process. It is fragile, prone to set-backs, and at this point in time, is mostly limited to regional policy elites in the business and political worlds rather than wider society. These regional spaces are weakly institutionalised and 'soft' in the sense that they are based often on dialogues and informal processes of diplomacy rather than formal multilateral organisation. Yet, these informal processes remain necessary if not a sufficient condition for the development of formal inter-governmental structures such as the ARF. Where institutions are weak or under-developed, discourse is strong. This is reflected in continuing proliferation of T2 and T3 activity witnessed in the region and which is bank-rolled by governments, business and philanthropy alike. While ASEAN-ISIS may now be of less policy significance in the more crowded and competitive realm of informal diplomacy, its experience shows how 'interpretive communities' composed of like-minded think tanks, independent experts and university scholars can be central to the articulation, formation and legitimation of new regional governance arrangements.
